Georgia State University Law Review
Volume 28
Issue 4 Summer 2012

Article 11

April 2013

Equal Protection for Transgendered Employees?
Analyzing the Court’s Call for More than Rational
Basis in the Glenn v. Brumby Decision
Gwen Havlik

Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Gwen Havlik, Equal Protection for Transgendered Employees? Analyzing the Court’s Call for More than Rational Basis in the Glenn v.
Brumby Decision, 28 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. (2013).
Available at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss4/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia State
University Law Review by an authorized editor of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.

Havlik: Equal Protection for Transgendered Employees? Analyzing the Court

EQUAL PROTECTION FOR TRANSGENDERED
EMPLOYEES? ANALYZING THE COURT’S CALL
FOR MORE THAN RATIONAL BASIS IN THE
GLENN V. BRUMBY DECISION
Gwen Havlik*
INTRODUCTION
In studies conducted between 1996 and 2006, 20% to 57% of
transgendered1 respondents reported being discriminated against in
the workplace, including being harassed, denied a promotion, being
fired, or denied employment altogether.2
In October 2005, shortly after she was diagnosed with gender
identity disorder, Vandiver Elizabeth Glenn, then known as Glenn
Morrison, was hired by the Georgia General Assembly’s Office of
Legislative Counsel (OLC).3 Two years later, Ms. Glenn informed
her supervisor of her intention to begin gender transition.4 After
conducting research and confirming Ms. Glenn’s intentions, OLC’s
Chief Legal Counsel, Sewell Brumby, informed Ms. Glenn she was
being terminated, giving reasons ranging from the transition being
“inappropriate” to “immoral and unnatural.”5
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, Georgia State University College of Law. Thanks to Professor Mary Radford
and the Law Review editors for their valuable insight and suggestions.
1. Transgender is “an umbrella term for people whose gender identity, expression, or behavior is
different from that typically associated with their assigned sex at birth.” M.V. LEE BADGETT, ET AL.,
BIAS IN THE WORKPLACE: CONSISTENT EVIDENCE OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY
DISCRIMINATION 9 (2007). The definition of transgender includes those who identify themselves as
“transsexual.” Id. The terms “transgender” and “transsexual” will be used interchangeably throughout
this Note.
2. Id. at 2. For example, a 2006 study conducted by the San Francisco Bay Guardian and the
Transgender Law Center reported that 40% of transgendered survey respondents had been denied
employment based on their transgender status, 24% reported being sexually harassed, and 23%
complained of co-workers’ persistent use of their old names; all in what “should be one of the most
tolerant cities for transgender people in the United States.” Id. at 7.
3. Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1290 (N.D. Ga. 2010), aff’d, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir.
2011).
4. Id. As part of her treatment for gender identity disorder, and in the hopes of providing
psychological relief, Ms. Glenn acted on her therapist’s recommendation to commence the real life
experience by living as a woman full time. Id.
5. After researching the issue, Brumby concluded that “some authority indicated terminating an
employee for undergoing gender transition was illegal, but some authority indicated that such firings are
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While Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
discrimination “based on sex,”6 no federal law explicitly prohibits
discrimination against transgendered employees.7 Ms. Glenn
nonetheless sought to challenge her employer’s discriminatory
actions, and brought a claim not under Title VII,8 but under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of her right to equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.9 Ms.
Glenn’s complaint alleged, inter alia, that she “did not conform to
Defendants’ sex stereotypes regarding males because of her
appearance and behavior . . . and was terminated for this reason.”10 In
granting Ms. Glenn’s motion for summary judgment, United States
District Judge Richard W. Story used a Title VII analogy to find the
plaintiff stated her claim by using the sex stereotyping theory.11 He
also held that the State failed to meet its burden of showing the
“exceedingly persuasive justification” needed to survive the
heightened scrutiny of a gender based Equal Protection Clause
claim.12 Many federal courts have allowed the sex stereotyping
permissible.” Id. at 1291. Other reasons given for her termination were that “gender transition was
inappropriate, . . . it would be disruptive, . . . some people would view it as a moral issue, and that it
would make Glenn’s coworkers uncomfortable.” Id. at 1292 (footnote omitted).
6. “It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any
individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
7. Glenn v. Brumby et. al., LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/glenn-vbrumby-et-al.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2010) (providing a summary of the case Glenn. v. Brumby). Cole
Thaler and Gregory Nevins of Lambda Legal represent plaintiff Vandiver Elizabeth Glenn. Glenn, 724
F. Supp. 2d at 1293.
8. It is unclear, based on the application of the 1991 amendments to the federal civil rights statute,
whether employees of state elected officials are covered under Title VII. Jillian T. Weiss, Georgia
Federal Court Rules for Trans Woman on Sex Discrimination Claim, BILERICO PROJECT (July 7, 2010),
http://www.bilerico.com/2010/07/georgia_federal_court_rules_for_trans_woman_on_sex.php. It is
possible Ms. Glenn did not bring suit under Title VII in an effort to make a “crystal clear, open and
shut” case without giving the defense a chance to “muddy the waters” by arguing the coverage point. Id.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284,
1290 (N.D. Ga. 2010), aff’d, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011).
10. Plaintiff also alleges she is a member of a particular and clearly identifiable group of people.
Glenn, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 1293. Ms. Glenn’s second claim alleges she was discriminated against by
being prevented from undergoing medically necessary treatment for gender identity disorder. Id.
11. See discussion infra Part I.
12. Glenn, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 1305; Arthur S. Leonard, Anti-Transgender Discrimination by State
Government
Employer
Found Unconstitutional,
LEONARD LINK, (July
6,
2010),
http://newyorklawschool.typepad.com/leonardlink/2010/07/antitransgender-discrimination-by-stategovernment-employer-found-unconstitutional.html.
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theory in claims brought by transgender plaintiffs in employment
discrimination claims, as well as under other federal statutes,13 but
such claims are not typically brought directly under the Equal
Protection Clause.14
This Note seeks to analyze the logical but novel reasoning used by
Judge Story to move a transgender discrimination claim from a
rational basis to an intermediate scrutiny standard under an Equal
Protection Clause claim.15 Part I explores the historical treatment of
discrimination claims brought by transgendered individuals.16 Part II
analyzes Judge Story’s decision in Glenn v. Brumby, following the
reasoning used in borrowing from Title VII precedent to reach his
conclusion that the plaintiff did, in fact, state a claim of sex
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.17 Part II also
discusses decisions holding that transsexual employees are not
entitled to protection under Title VII or the Equal Protection
Clause.18 Part III proposes that when the United States Supreme
Court is eventually faced with deciding a transgender employment
discrimination claim, Judge Story’s reasoning based on sex
stereotyping should be extended to either, or both, Title VII and
constitutional claims of discrimination brought by transgender
employees.19

13. See discussion infra Part I. Courts have extended the sex stereotyping theory to claims under the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the Gender Motivated Violence Act as well as for employment
discrimination claims. Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust, 214 F.3d 213, 216 (1st Cir. 2000); Schwenk v.
Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1200–01 (9th Cir. 2000).
14. See Leonard, supra note 12 (noting Judge Story “ventur[ed] into new territory as he ruled that
sexual stereotyping encountered by transsexuals in a governmental workplace can provide the basis for a
constitutional sex discrimination claim”).
15. JoAnna McNamara, Employment Discrimination and the Transsexual 2 (1996) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the author) (noting that claims for equal protection for transsexuals are
“difficult to uphold because the courts generally use a rational basis analysis”); see also discussion infra
Part I.D.
16. See discussion infra Part I. Part I includes an explanation of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins to extend sex discrimination claims to include sex stereotyping and the
evolution of sex stereotype claims as they apply to transsexuals, as well as the treatment of transgender
discrimination claims brought under the Equal Protection Clause. Id.
17. See discussion infra Part II.
18. See discussion infra Part II.D.
19. See discussion infra Part III. “To date, the Supreme Court has never decided a transgender
workplace discrimination claim under either Title VII or the Constitution.” Leonard, supra note 12.
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I. HISTORY OF TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
A. Transgender Claims Brought Prior to Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins
Beginning almost forty years ago when the first case of
discrimination against a transsexual was decided,20 courts have
consistently ruled that transgender identity is not within the definition
of “based on sex” for purposes of Title VII.21 These early cases give
the primary rationale for their decisions as statutory interpretation,
finding that “sex” means “anatomical sex,” or more simply put, that
sex is “a simple matter of biological difference.”22 These cases also
rely on legislative intent and interpret Congress’s continuous
rejection of proposed legislation giving protection based on sexual
orientation to mean Congress did not intend to extend the meaning of
“based on sex.”23 Courts were no more receptive to claims brought
on constitutional grounds, finding that discrimination against a
transgendered employee did not state a claim under Title VII and that
transsexuals are not a protected class for purposes of the Equal
Protection Clause.24
20. Grossman v. Bernards Twp. Bd. of Educ., No. 74-1904, 1975 WL 302, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 10,
1975) (finding a firing based on a teacher’s sex-reassignment surgery did not implicate Title VII).
21. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding “sex” in Title VII means
only anatomical sex rather than gender); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 749 (8th Cir.
1982); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662–63 (9th Cir. 1977) (refusing to extend
Title VII to transsexuals because the discrimination is based on gender and not “based on sex”); Powell
v. Read’s, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369, 371 (D. Md. 1977).
22. Jillian Todd Weiss, Transgender Identity, Textualism, and the Supreme Court: What is the
“Plain Meaning” of “Sex” in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?, 18 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L.
REV. 573, 574–75 (2009).
23. Mary Kristen Kelly, (Trans)forming Traditional Interpretations of Title VII: “Because of Sex”
and the Transgender Dilemma, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 219, 224 (2010). In an ironic note,
“sex” itself was a last minute addition to the original Title VII proposed legislation, added in an attempt
to defeat the entire bill. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was surprised when
one-third of the claims in the first year under the act were brought on the basis of sex. Shaping
Employment Discrimination Law, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/1965-71/shaping.html
(last visited Oct. 30, 2010). The first attempt to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
was made in 1975, when Congress proposed adding “affectional” and “sexual preference” to the
language of Title VII. Civil Rights Amendments Act of 1975, H.R. 166, 94th Cong. (1975). From 1981
through 2001, over thirty proposed bills were introduced attempting to prohibit discrimination on the
basis of “affectional” and “sexual” preference. Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ.A. 00-3114, 2002
WL 31098541, at *4 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002). All have been unsuccessful. Id.
24. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1227–28 (10th Cir. 2007) (following Brown v.
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B. Sex Stereotyping Under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
Little change has come about in the last four decades concerning
the meaning and interpretation of “based on sex” as it applies to
transgender discrimination.25 However, in its 1989 landmark decision
in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court for the first time
recognized that a cause of action for sex discrimination under Title
VII could be based on sex stereotyping.26 In Price Waterhouse, the
plaintiff brought suit against her employer under Title VII, claiming
she was discriminated against on the basis of sex after being denied
partnership.27 In her claim, Ms. Hopkins pointed to the reasons given
by the partners who opposed her partnership as being discriminatory,
including statements that she was “too macho” and “needed a course
at charm school.”28 The Court held that “an employer who acts on the
basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must
not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”29 In response to the
defendant’s suggestion that sex stereotyping has no legal relevance, a
well-quoted passage of the decision states: “we are beyond the day
when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or
insisting that they match the stereotype associated with their
group.”30 A number of courts have since held that discriminating
Zavaras and Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co. in holding transsexuals are not members of a protected
class for purposes of Equal Protection); Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 971 (10th Cir. 1995) (following
Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co. in deciding transsexuals are not members of a protected class, but
noting research about gender identity may call for a reevaluation of Holloway v. Arthur Andersen &
Co.). See generally Holloway, 566 F.2d 659.
25. Weiss, supra note 22, at 576 (discussing Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority as it relied on
analyzing the current meaning of sex).
26. See generally Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Kelly, supra note 23, at 226
(noting the Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins decision as acknowledging a new specific cause of action).
27. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 232. Ms. Hopkins was working as a senior manager for the
defendant, a nationwide professional accounting firm, when she was proposed for partnership. Id. at
233. The decision for partnership was not based on fixed guidelines, but considered comments and
recommendations of existing partners. Id. at 232.
28. Id. at 235. Other comments made in opposition to Ms. Hopkins’s partnership were that she was
“overly aggressive” and “overcompensated for being a woman.” Id. The partner who gave her the news
went so far as to suggest that Ms. Hopkins “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.” Id.
29. Id. at 250.
30. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1223 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Price Waterhouse,
490 U.S. at 251); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Price Waterhouse,
490 U.S. at 251); Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1297 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (quoting Price
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against an employee for failing to conform to sex stereotypes is
actionable under Title VII.31
C. Sex Stereotyping as It Applies to Transsexuals
Transgender employees were optimistic that the Supreme Court
decision of Price Waterhouse would pave the way for their
discrimination claims.32 As the Sixth Circuit explained, in “earlier
jurisprudence, male-to-female transsexuals . . . whose outward
behavior and emotional identity did not conform . . . were denied
Title VII protection by courts because they were considered victims
of ‘gender’ rather than ‘sex’ discrimination,”33 but “the approach in
Holloway, Sommers, and Ulane . . . has been eviscerated by Price
Waterhouse.”34 For the Sixth Circuit, the extension of Price
Waterhouse to transgender employees follows since “just as an
employer who discriminates against women for not wearing dresses
or makeup is engaging in sex discrimination under the rationale of
Price Waterhouse, ‘employers who discriminate against men because
they do wear dresses and makeup, or otherwise act femininely, are

Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251), aff’d, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011); Schroer v. Billington, 525 F. Supp.
2d 58, 62 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251); Kastl v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty.
Coll. Dist., No. Civ.02-1531PHX-SRB, 2004 WL 2008954, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 3, 2004) (quoting Price
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251); Kelly, supra note 23, at 227 (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at
251).
31. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1223 (citing Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 262–64
(3d Cir. 2001); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 874–75 (9th Cir. 2001); Higgins v. New
Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999); Doe ex rel. Doe v. City of Belleville,
119 F.3d 563, 580–81 (7th Cir. 1997)); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 303 (D.D.C. 2008)
(citing Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005)).
32. Kelly, supra note 23, at 227 (citing Joel W. Friedman, Gender Nonconformity and the
Unfulfilled Promise of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 205, 222 (2007)).
33. Smith, 378 F.3d at 572 (recognizing the reasoning of Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Holloway v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., and Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc. as being based on a traditional
definition of “sex” for the purposes of interpreting Title VII).
34. Id. at 573 (citing Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000)) (holding “Title VII
encompasses both the anatomical differences between men and women and gender” and that the
plaintiff stated a claim because “the perpetrator’s actions stem from the fact that he believed that the
victim was a man who ‘failed to act like’ one”)). But see Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081,
1084–85 (7th Cir. 1984); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (denying
relief to transsexual plaintiffs based on reasoning that the plain meaning of the statute “based on sex”
should be given a dictionary definition); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662–64
(9th Cir. 1977).
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also engaging in sex discrimination.’”35 United States District Court
Judge Nancy Atlas explained the reasoning alternatively by stating,
“[T]ransexuality is not a bar to [a] sex stereotyping claim. Title VII is
violated when an employer discriminates against an employee,
transsexual or not, because he or she failed to act or appear
sufficiently masculine or feminine enough . . . . 36
In analyzing precedent for sex stereotyping claims made by
transgender employees, Judge Story noted in Glenn v. Brumby that
several courts have followed the Sixth Circuit in recognizing that
transgender employees may plead claims of sex stereotyping and
gender discrimination under Title VII.37 However, the Seventh
Circuit, relying on pre-Price Waterhouse precedent, explicitly
rejected the theory that a transsexual can bring a sex stereotyping
discrimination claim under Title VII.38 It should be noted that these
favorable decisions are not giving relief based on a transgender status
per se, but because the plaintiffs have shown evidence that actions
taken by the employer were based on gender stereotypes.39 Although
some argue the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Title VII in Price
Waterhouse provides adequate protection for men and women who
fail to conform to gender norms,40 others argue the Supreme Court
35. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1223 (quoting Smith, 378 F.3d at 574).
36. Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Grp., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 653, 660 (S.D. Tex.
2008) (internal citations omitted).
37. Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1298 (citing Smith, 378 F.3d at 572, 575). See Kastl v.
Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 325 F. App’x 492, 493 (9th Cir. 2009); Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1224;
Creed v. Family Express Corp., No. 3:06-CV-465RM, 2009 WL 35237 at *6 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 5, 2009);
Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 308; Lopez, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 667–68.
38. Glenn, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 1298 (citing Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ. A. 00-3114, 2002
WL 31098541 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002) (relying on a Seventh Circuit pre-Price Waterhouse case in
finding transsexuals do not have a cognizable claim under Title VII)). Judge Story notes that the
Northern District of Georgia “has also previously held that transsexuals are not a suspect classification”
in Rush v. Johnson, 565 F. Supp. 856, 868 (N.D. Ga.1983). Glenn, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 1299. However,
Judge Story points to Smith, 378 F.3d 566, as addressing the reasoning previously given for the failure
of claims brought by transsexuals before the decision in Price Waterhouse. Glenn, 724 F. Supp. 2d at
1299.
39. Kelly, supra note 23, at 230.
40. Mary Ann Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man
in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995); Katherine M. Franke, The Central
Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1
(1995); Colleen Keating, Extending Title VII Protection to Non-Gender-Conforming Men, 4 MOD. AM.
82, 82 (2008) (citing Friedman, supra note 32, at 222); Marvin Dunson III, Comment, Sex, Gender, and
Transgender: The Present and Future Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
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should broaden the very definition of “based on sex” to include
transgender identity.41
D. Transgender Discrimination Claims Under Equal Protection
In analyzing a claim under the Equal Protection Clause,42 a court
must determine whether the disparate treatment is based on a suspect
classification or affects a fundamental right.43 Historically, the same
cases denying protection for transgendered employees under Title
VII have also specifically held transsexuals are not a protected class
for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.44 The Supreme Court
has stated, “[I]f the disparate treatment is not based on a suspect
classification . . . the Court must apply the rational basis test.”45
Following this reasoning, courts have subjected claims based on
transgender discrimination to a rational basis review,46 requiring that
the differential treatment only bear a rational relation to some
legitimate end.47
L. 465 (2001)).
41. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 23, at 230; Weiss, supra note 22 (analyzing the likelihood of the
Supreme Court upholding application of sex discrimination law to transgender employees).
42. “No [s]tate shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of laws.” U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
43. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
44. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1227 (10th Cir. 2007); Holloway v. Arthur
Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1977); Kastl v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., No.
Civ.02-1531PHX-SRB, 2004 WL 2008954, at *8, n.11 (D. Ariz. June 3, 2004) (noting plaintiff in that
case did not suggest transsexual status placed her in a class, but pointing out other courts have held
transsexuals are not in a protected class).
45. Farmer v. Hawk-Sawyer, 69 F. Supp. 2d 120, 125 (D.D.C. 1999) (citing City of Cleburne, 473
U.S. at 440).
46. United States District Judge Naomi Buchwald notes, “As plaintiff points to no court decision that
has found transgender individuals a protected class for purposes of Fourteenth Amendment analysis, and
the Court has found none, her claims . . . are subject to a rational basis review.” Lopez v. City of New
York, No. 05 Civ. 10321(NRB), 2009 WL 229956, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2009); see also Gomez v.
Maass., No. 90-35390, 1990 WL 177776, at *2 (9th Cir. Nov. 16, 1990) (holding a transsexual is not a
member of a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to greater than rational basis scrutiny); Stevens v.
Williams, No. CV-05-1790-ST, 2008 WL 916991, at *13 (D. Or. Mar. 27, 2008) (noting “transsexuals
are not a suspect class for purposes of the equal protection clause” and “therefore, classifications based
upon these grounds must only be ‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests’” (quoting Pruitt
v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1164–66 (9th Cir. 1992))).
47. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). The first part of a rational basis review is
“identifying . . . a goal which the enacting government body could have been pursuing,” and next
determining whether a rational basis exists to believe the action would further that goal. Joel v. City of
Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1358 (11th Cir. 2000).
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Rational basis scrutiny has similarly been applied outside the
employment context for transgender discrimination. For example,
claims of discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause are
commonly brought by transgendered inmates against authorities of
the institution, given that the prison officials act under color of state
law, and courts consistently hold that only a rational basis review is
required when analyzing discrimination claims under the Equal
Protection Clause for inmates.48 Nor have courts given more than a
rational basis review to claims under the Equal Protection Clause by
homosexuals suffering from discrimination.49 As neither transgender
nor homosexual discrimination is considered within the definition of
discrimination “based on sex,”50 neither is given the heightened
scrutiny the Supreme Court requires of a classification based on
sex.51 One court noted that “[w]hether discrimination on the basis of
nonconformity with sex stereotypes constitutes discrimination on the
basis of sex for the purposes of equal protection claims . . . is an open
question.”52 It would seem Judge Story attempted to answer this open
48. See, e.g., Fields v. Smith, 712 F. Supp. 2d 830, 868 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (applying rational basis
review to plaintiff’s challenge of a state law preventing treatment of gender identity disorder to inmates
because there was no suspect classification at issue); Lopez, 2009 WL 229956, at *13 (recognizing the
state had several sufficient rational bases for not allowing plaintiff inmate to wear women’s clothing);
Stevens, 2008 WL 916991, at *13 (holding the state’s interest in ensuring inmate safety was
substantially related to the action, but it only needed to be a legitimate and rationally related reason);
Wolfe v. Horn, 130 F. Supp. 2d 648, 655 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (finding the state had a “legitimate penological
interest in protecting inmates” sufficient to survive rational basis); Farmer, 69 F. Supp. 2d at 127.
49. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 953–54 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding
harassment of a gay teacher accorded less protection under Equal Protection than race and gender-based
harassment); Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1165–66 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding rational basis scrutiny
needed for claims based upon homosexuality); Swift v. United States, 649 F. Supp. 596, 602 (D.D.C.
1986) (finding the government offered no explanation for terminating plaintiff that was rationally
related to a legitimate government purpose).
50. See Weiss, supra note 22 (giving a detailed analysis of the history and development of the terms
“transgender” and “sex”); see also discussion supra Part I.A, I.B.
51. “Intermediate scrutiny is applied to classifications based upon sex.” Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F.
Supp. 2d 1284, 1297 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (citing Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988)), aff’d, 663 F.3d
1312 (11th Cir. 2011). “Classifications on the basis of sex are closely scrutinized.” Kastl v. Maricopa
Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. Civ. 02-1531PHX-SRB, 2004 WL 2008954, at *8 (D. Ariz. June 3, 2004)
(quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996)).
52. Kastl, 2004 WL 2008954, at *8. Leaving the question open, the court notes that while “[t]he
Supreme Court has held that discrimination against those who fail to conform with sex stereotypes
constitutes discrimination . . . for the purposes of Title VII, . . . there is little indication of whether this
form of discrimination also violates the [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause.” Id. at *8 n.12 (citation omitted).
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question in Glenn v. Brumby, holding that a transgender employee
can state an Equal Protection claim under a sex stereotyping theory
and requiring the state justification to survive intermediate, rather
than rational basis, scrutiny.53
II. ANALYSIS OF GLENN V. BRUMBY
A. Applying Title VII’s Framework to an Equal Protection Claim
Ms. Glenn brought her claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to address
the violation of her civil right to be free from discrimination on the
basis of sex in public employment, a right protected by the Equal
Protection Clause.54 To establish her sex discrimination claim, Ms.
Glenn had to prove she “suffered purposeful or intentional
discrimination on the basis of sex.”55 The federal circuit courts have
recognized that when a § 1983 claim is brought to challenge the same
type of employer conduct that can be remedied under a Title VII
claim, the elements of the two causes of action are the same.56 As
such, Judge Story used the Title VII “McDonnell Douglas57
framework,” which states that a plaintiff has the burden to first show
an inference of discriminatory intent in order to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination.58 The burden then shifts to the employer
53. Glenn, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 1299.
54. Id. at 1296. “In a § 1983 action, a court must determine ‘whether the plaintiff has been deprived
of a right secured by the Constitution and laws.’” Id. (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140
(1979)). Section 1983 is a statutory vehicle for addressing the “deprivation of any rights . . . secured by
the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
55. Glenn, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 1297 (citing Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977)).
56. Demoret v. Zegarelli, 451 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that once color of law is
established, the analysis for a § 1983 claim is similar to an employment discrimination claim under Title
VII, except that a § 1983 claim can be brought against an individual); Stuart v. Jefferson Cnty. Dep’t of
Human Res., 152 F. App’x 798, 802 (11th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that when § 1983 is a parallel remedy
to Title VII, the elements are the same); Wright v. Rolette Cnty., 417 F.3d 879, 884 (8th Cir. 2005)
(stating the elements of a prima facie case are the same regardless of whether a plaintiff seeks relief
under a Title VII or § 1983 claim); Beardsley v. Webb, 30 F.3d 524, 527 (4th Cir. 1994) (pointing out
that Title VII and § 1983 “coexist to afford relief for employment discrimination” and the standards are
the same for litigation under both); Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 896 (1st Cir. 1988) (using the
same precedent developed under Title VII to analyze a § 1983 claim); Klen v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric.,
No. CIVA05CV02452EWNCBS, 2007 WL 2022061, at *19 (D. Colo. July 9, 2007).
57. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
58. Glenn, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 1301 (quoting Brooks v. Cnty. Comm’n of Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 446
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to rebut the presumption of discrimination and prove the challenged
action was taken for a “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason.”59 The
plaintiff then has the burden to show the employer’s proffered reason
was “pretext for unlawful discrimination.”60 Judge Story found the
evidence presented by Ms. Glenn “more than sufficient to establish a
prima facie case of discriminatory intent.”61 Under the framework,
the burden then shifted to the defendant to prove a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for termination.62 In the case of a sex-based
claim brought under the Equal Protection Clause, this meant the
defendant had to show an ‘“exceedingly persuasive justification’ for
[Ms. Glenn’s] termination.”63 This analysis focuses on the heightened
requirement of intermediate scrutiny as applied to the reasons given
for terminating a transgender employee.64
B. The Parties’ Arguments on Motion for Summary Judgment
To prove her Equal Protection claim, Ms. Glenn had to
demonstrate she was “a member of an identifiable group and that
there was differential treatment ‘based on [her] membership of that
F.3d 1160, 1162 (11th Cir. 2006)). In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Supreme Court set forth
the framework for analyzing a Title VII claim. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 807. The plaintiff must
show an inference of discrimination to make out a prima facie case. The defendant then has burden of
production of showing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the action, and then the plaintiff must
show the proffered reason was pretext for discrimination. Id.
59. Glenn, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 1301 (quoting Brooks, 446 F.3d at 1162).
60. Id. (quoting Brooks, 446 F.3d at 1162). The court noted that while “the intermediate burdens of
production shift back and forth, the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the employer
intentionally discriminated against the employee remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Id.
61. Id. at 1302 (finding defendant failed to identify anything unrelated to Ms. Glenn’s intention to
come to work as a woman as a reason for termination, and at the very least, her appearance was a
motivating factor for the termination).
62. Id.
63. Id. (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996)). In his decision, Judge Story
analyzed the conduct under the Title VII framework in deciding whether a prima facie case existed, and
then, having found sex stereotype discrimination is “on the basis of sex,” deemed those who do not
conform to the stereotypes as being a “protected class based on sex.” Id. at 1300. The courts in Etsitty
and Smith similarly analyzed a discrimination claim under Title VII and Equal Protection
interchangeably. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1227–28 (10th Cir. 2007) (analyzing only
plaintiff’s Title VII claim and finding her Equal Protection claim failed for the same reasons); Smith v.
City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 577 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding, without separately analyzing, that plaintiff’s
“claims of gender discrimination pursuant to Title VII easily constitute a claim of sex discrimination
grounded in the Equal Protection Clause”).
64. Id.

Published by Reading Room, 2012

11

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 11

1324

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:4

very group.’”65 The purpose of such a requirement is to
“maintain . . . focus
on
discrimination,
and
to
avoid
66
constitutionalizing every state regulatory dispute.” To get beyond
the defendants’ motion to dismiss, plaintiff argued that she was
indeed a member of a class based on sex67 and pointed to court
decisions finding failure to conform to employer sex stereotyping as
stating a claim for discrimination.68 The plaintiff cited cases brought
by both transsexual and non-transsexual plaintiffs69 that used the
familiar Price Waterhouse theory of sex stereotyping to argue
discrimination based on sex, both under Title VII and Equal
Protection Clause claims.70 However, the cases plaintiff cited under
Equal Protection Clause claims did not specifically analyze or
directly point to discrimination against a transsexual as requiring an
intermediate scrutiny.71
On the other hand, the defendants’ motion to dismiss pointed out
that the court in Rush v. Johnson previously held “as a matter of law
that transsexuals as a group are not a suspect class based on sex.”72 In
65. Glenn v. Brumby, 632 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1314 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (quoting Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
66. Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1207 (11th Cir. 2007).
67. Glenn, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 1315.
68. Id. (citing Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 577 (6th Cir. 2004); Back v. Hastings on
Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 117–21 (2nd Cir. 2004); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters.,
Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874–75 (9th Cir. 2001); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008);
Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Grp., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 653, 660 (S.D. Tex. 2008)).
69. The plaintiffs in Smith v. City of Salem, Shroer v. Billington, and Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging &
Diagnostic Group, Inc. were transsexuals transitioning from male to female; the plaintiff in Back v.
Hastings on Hudson Union Free School District was female; and the plaintiff in Nichols v. Azteca
Restaurant Enterprises, Inc. was a male whose coworkers perceived him as a homosexual. Glenn, 632
F. Supp. 2d at 1315.
70. Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., Shroer v. Billington, and Lopez v. River Oaks
Imaging & Diagnostic Group, Inc. were Title VII claims; Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free
School District was an Equal Protection Clause claim only; and the claim in Smith v. City of Salem was
both. Glenn, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 1315.
71. The plaintiff in Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free School District claimed her employer
terminated her based on the sex stereotypical notion that a woman with small children cannot be
dedicated to her job. Back, 365 F.3d at 119. The court focused on the plaintiff’s ability to survive
summary judgment, finding the defendant’s proffered non-discriminatory reasons for terminating
plaintiff did not foreclose a material issue of fact, but the court did not analyze whether the reasons
served a legitimate or important objective. Id. at 122. The court in Smith v. City of Salem analyzed the
plaintiff’s Title VII claim and, finding the elements to be the same as under an Equal Protection Clause
discrimination claim, simply recognized the plaintiff stated a claim. Smith, 378 F.3d at 577.
72. Glenn, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 1315.
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Rush v. Johnson, the plaintiff brought an Equal Protection Clause
claim after being denied Medicaid assistance in paying for the cost of
her sex reassignment surgery.73 The court found that transsexuals
were not a suspect class, and as such, applied the rational basis
standard in finding Medicaid’s prohibition against reimbursement for
experimental surgery to be rationally related to the legitimate
government interest in public health.74 In his order granting Ms.
Glenn’s motion for summary judgment, Judge Story explained that
the court’s prior decision in Rush v. Johnson was “not at odds with
the Supreme Court’s interpretation . . . in the Price Waterhouse case”
because the decision still holds that “while ‘transsexuals’ are not
members of a protected class based on sex, those who do not
conform to gender stereotypes are members of a protected class
based on sex.”75 In finding Ms. Glenn sufficiently pleaded her claim
of sex stereotyping and gender discrimination,76 Judge Story denied
defendants’ motion to dismiss and declared the plaintiff’s claim
involved a “classification requiring more than rational basis
scrutiny.”77 The defendants failed to plead any government purpose
for Ms. Glenn’s termination, and the claim was allowed to proceed.78
The decision was before the court on plaintiff Glenn and defendant
Brumby’s cross motions for summary judgment.79 In her brief,
plaintiff specified her argument that she was “a member of a class
based on sex” by clarifying that the identifiable group she was a
member of is “a group of individuals who do not conform to sex
73. Rush v. Johnson, 565 F. Supp. 856, 857 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
74. Id. at 868–69 (relying on Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co. in finding “‘that transsexuals are
not necessarily a “discrete and insular minority,” nor has it been established that transsexuality is an
“immutable characteristic determined solely by accident of birth” like race or national origin’”).
75. Glenn, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 1315 (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 1316.
77. Id. at 1316–17 (explaining the heightened level of scrutiny the defendant must meet to justify
differential treatment based on sex (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996))).
78. Id. at 1317. In his order denying defendants’ motion to dismiss, Judge Story also cautioned that
“[a]nticipated reactions of others” do not justify discrimination, nor will the discriminatory treatment
survive any Equal Protection review when “‘the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the
class of persons affected.’” Id. (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634–35 (1996)).
79. Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1295 (N.D. Ga. 2010), aff’d, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir
2011). Defendants Richardson, Cagle, Johnson, and Underwood also filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment, but plaintiff’s Motion for Order for Dismissal of defendants Richardson, Cagle, Johnson, and
Underwood was granted. Id.
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stereotypes.”80 Plaintiff argued she was similarly situated with other
persons who were treated differently because she, as with all other
“similarly situated” employees in her position, completed all
employer-required testing and her work product was average.81 To
satisfy the next required element of her Equal Protection Clause
claim, plaintiff asserted she was treated differently by her employer
because of her membership in the identifiable group—those who
don’t conform with sex stereotypes—and pointed out that
defendant’s comment on her nonconformity was inappropriate and
“exactly what courts describe as paradigmatic sex stereotyping.”82
Having argued that her Equal Protection Clause claim based on sex
requires a heightened level of scrutiny,83 plaintiff then argued that her
termination was neither rationally nor substantially related to a
sufficient government interest.84 In doing so, plaintiff insisted that the
proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for termination—avoiding
anticipated negative reactions of others and avoiding potential
lawsuits—were neither legitimate nor important government
interests.85 Even if the interests were legitimate or important, plaintiff
stated that the hypothesized interests of avoiding workplace
distractions or preserving confidentiality in the workplace86 were not
substantially related to those interests.87
80. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment Against
Defendant Sewell R. Brumby at 8, Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (No. 1:08CV-2360), aff’d, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir 2011).
81. Id. at 11. Showing plaintiff was similarly situated to other employees—but for membership in an
identifiable group—is a required element on an Equal Protection claim in order to maintain focus on the
discrimination. Id. (citing Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1207 (11th Cir. 2007)).
82. Id. at 14 n.3 (citing Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 577 (6th Cir. 2004); Rene v. MGM
Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260
F.3d 257, 263 n.5 (3d Cir. 2001); Doe ex rel. Doe v. City of Bellville, 119 F.3d 563, 580 (7th Cir.
1997)).
83. Id. at 8–9.
84. Id. at 14.
85. Id. at 14–19. The Supreme Court has rejected both reasons given by defendant as a rational basis.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448–49 (1985).
86. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment Against
Defendant Sewell R. Brumby, supra note 80, at 19–21 (anticipating the arguments of defendant in
support of his Motion for Summary Judgment). Defendant did not point to any breach of confidentiality,
nor anything that would give rise to potential lawsuits, and defendant was the only employee who
appeared distracted by plaintiff’s nonconformity. Id.
87. Id.
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In support of his own motion for summary judgment, defendant
Brumby recognized that an intermediate level of scrutiny is applied
to classifications based on sex,88 but argued that plaintiff’s claims
were not within the definition of a suspect class based on sex, and
were therefore entitled only to a rational relationship test.89
Defendant claimed that the plaintiff was simply trying to “elevate her
status to the intermediate level of scrutiny” by claiming her
termination was due to sex stereotype nonconformity90 in an attempt
to avoid the ruling of Rush v. Johnson.91 Brumby did not ignore the
reasoning of Price Waterhouse nor its extension to claims brought by
transsexual plaintiffs, but pointed to several cases where transsexual
plaintiffs were unsuccessful in their sex stereotyping claims.92
Defendant went on to argue that the only instance where a sex
stereotyping theory can state a claim is when the transsexual plaintiff
actually produces evidence that the adverse decision was based on
the sexual stereotyping itself.93 But in this case, defendant stated
there was no such direct evidence.94 Therefore, plaintiff failed to
prove defendant terminated her for being too feminine or not
masculine enough and also had not proven nonconformity to sex
stereotypes which place her in a protected class.95 Defendant further
attempted to persuade the court by arguing the termination action
would have applied equally to males or females because it was based

88. Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at
9, Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (No. 1:08-CV-2360).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 10–14 (citing Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1227 (10th Cir. 2007); Creed v.
Family Express Corp., No. 3:06-CV-465RM, 2009 WL 35237 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 5, 2009); Kastl v.
Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. Civ.02-1531PHX-SRB, 2004 WL 2008954 (D. Ariz. June 3,
2004); Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ. A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541 (E.D. La. Sept. 16,
2002)).
93. Id. at 15 (citing Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004); Lopez v. River Oaks
Imaging & Diagnostic Grp., Inc., 542 F.Supp.2d 653 (S.D. Tex. 2008); Schroer v. Billington, 525
F.Supp.2d 58 (D.D.C. 2007)).
94. Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment,
supra note 88, at 16.
95. Id.
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on the transition from one sex to the other, and not on the appearance
or behavior that is expected from one particular gender.96
C. The Decision in Glenn v. Brumby
In deciding that plaintiff made her prima facie case of
discrimination,97 Judge Story necessarily accepted not only that a
Price Waterhouse Title VII sex stereotyping theory claim could be
applied to a claim of discrimination brought under the Equal
Protection Clause, but also that the claim could be made by
transsexual employees.98 In analyzing the sex stereotyping claim
brought by Ms. Glenn, Judge Story began by describing the action
before the court as “not the first in which an individual with [gender
identity disorder] has relied upon . . . Price Waterhouse to assert a
claim resulting from an adverse employment action.”99 After
reviewing precedent from various circuits, Judge Story decided to
concur with the majority of courts that have addressed the issue, and
found discrimination against a transgendered individual because of
his or her failure to conform to gender stereotypes constitutes
discrimination based on sex.100 In so holding, the court found the
plaintiff to be a member of an identifiable group based on her sex.101
This meant the defendant had to satisfy the burden of intermediate
scrutiny by “showing at least that the classification serves ‘important
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means

96. Defendant Sewell Brumby’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment at 3–4, Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (No.
108CV02360). Defendant found support in the excerpt, “Gender Identity Disorder can be distinguished
from simple non-conformity to stereotypical sexual behavior by the extent and pervasiveness of the
cross-gender wishes, interests, and activities.” Id. (quoting DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS §11.3 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (1994)).
97. Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1305 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (“Plaintiff’s desire to come to
work dressed as a woman did not comport with how Defendant Brumby believed a biological male
should act . . . .”), aff’d, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1297–98 (discussing e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004)).
100. Id. at 1298 (citing Smith, 378 F.3d at 572, 575 and Kastl v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist.,
325 F. App’x. 492, 493 (9th Cir. 2009), among others, as examples).
101. Id. at 1296.
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employed’ are ‘substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives.’”102
As discussed,103 and as noted by Judge Story in his opinion, the
defendant based his defense on the theory that plaintiff was not a
member of a protected class, and therefore, her claim was not based
on sex.104 Under this belief, Mr. Brumby only argued that his
decision to terminate Ms. Glenn survived the rational relationship
test, and urged that the rational basis test should be the appropriate
scrutiny applied. 105 He did not argue, in the alternative, that his
actions could meet an intermediate scrutiny.106 As the case was
before the court on a motion for summary judgment, Judge Story still
considered defendant’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason of
avoiding lawsuits under the substantially related relationship test,107
and found it did not survive because the justification could not be
invented post hoc in response to litigation.108
In finding the defendant’s reasons were not substantially related to
an important government interest, Judge Story held the decision to
terminate Ms. Glenn violated her rights under the Equal Protection
102. Id. at 1302 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)). Plaintiff’s
second claim asserted that defendant discriminated against her as a result of her gender identity disorder
and that her termination prevented her from undergoing treatment. Id. at 1305. “[T]he Equal Protection
Clause protects individuals with disability and illness (physical and mental) from discrimination by the
states and that laws classifying individuals on such a basis must meet rational basis scrutiny.” Id. (citing
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 466). Possible lawsuits for invasion of privacy
or sexual harassment resulting from an individual with male genitalia using a women’s restroom, “even
meritless suits, [are] a rational, legitimate government interest.” Id. at 1307. Since her claim of
discrimination based on a medical condition failed under the rational relationship test, given the reasons
proffered for termination, Ms. Glenn would have been denied all relief had Judge Story not found her
sex stereotyping theory required the heightened intermediate scrutiny. Id.
103. See discussion supra Part I.B.
104. Glenn, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 1302; see also Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 88, at 9–18; Defendant Sewell Brumby’s
Memorandum of Law in Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 96, at 2–5.
105. Defendant Sewell Brumby’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, supra note 96 (arguing that plaintiff misinterpreted the rational relationship test in
an attempt to heighten the scrutiny or “create a hybrid of the rational relationship test and the substantial
relationship test”).
106. Glenn, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1302. .
107. Id. at 1303.
108. Id. (finding there was no evidence that Ms. Glenn’s bathroom usage was an actual concern at the
time of termination). However, avoiding lawsuits, such as those by other employees for invasion of
privacy based on restroom usage, was found to survive a rational basis test needed under Ms. Glenn’s
medical condition discrimination claim. Id. at 1306.
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Clause, and granted her motion for summary judgment.109 In so
doing, and without saying as much, the Glenn v. Brumby decision
followed a logical step by step process: (1) Price Waterhouse created
a cause of action for nonconformity to sex stereotypes under Title
VII based on sex,110 (2) the application of the sex stereotype theory
has been extended to claims brought by transsexuals under Title
VII,111 and (3) the elements of a Title VII claim are the same as an
Equal Protection claim brought under § 1983.112 Therefore, a sex
stereotyping claim brought by a transsexual employee is a claim
based on sex that requires the government interest to survive a
heightened intermediate scrutiny, rather than a rational basis test.
D. Decisions Denying Relief To Transsexual Employees
Not all courts have reached the same decision, nor have they used
the same reasoning as Judge Story in granting relief to a transsexual
employee alleging discrimination. In Oiler v. Winn-Dixie, the court
relied on the “repeated failure of Congress to amend Title VII” to
“support[] the argument that Congress did not intend Title VII to
prohibit discrimination on the basis of a gender identity disorder.”113
The opinion begins by stating that numerous courts have held
transsexual employees did not have cognizable discrimination claims
under Title VII, even if they were terminated for being transsexual,
because “based on sex” is interpreted to mean biological sex.114 But,
109. Id. at 1305. At the subsequent remedies hearing, the parties agreed that reinstatement of the
plaintiff’s prior employment position was an appropriate remedy. Glenn v. Brumby, No. 1:08-CV-2360RWS, 2010 WL 3731107, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 15, 2010). In addition, Ms. Glenn sought seniority
restoration, an injunction against future discriminatory conduct, and sex discrimination training for
defendant Brumby. Id. Ms. Glenn’s injunction and seniority requests were granted, however the court
did not find sex discrimination training for Brumby an appropriate remedy and denied the request. Id. at
*2. The court reasoned Mr. Brumby did not believe his conduct violated the plaintiff’s legal rights, and
nothing indicated he would discriminate against plaintiff on the basis of sex in the future. Id.
110. See discussion supra Part I.B.
111. See discussion supra Part I.C.
112. See discussion supra Part II.A.
113. Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ. A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541, at *6 (E.D. La. Sept.
16, 2002). Plaintiff, a heterosexual transgendered employee, only presented as a woman outside of
work. Id. at *1. Plaintiff’s supervisors stated the reason for terminating the plaintiff was fear that WinnDixie customers would recognize the plaintiff while off-duty and disapprove of his “lifestyle.” Id. at *2.
114. Id. at *4 (citing Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977); Sommers v.
Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 749 (8th Cir. 1982); Rentos v. Oce-Office Sys., No. 95 CIV. 7908
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it is also recognized in Oiler v. Winn-Dixie that the social climate is
much different today than when Title VII was originally passed in
1964, and “[m]any individuals having such [sexual identity and
sexual orientation] issues have opened wide the closet doors” and
brought the issues to mainstream attention.115 And yet, despite the
public acknowledgement of these issues, Congress has never clarified
Title VII’s definition of “based on sex.”116 In fact, none of the more
than thirty proposals that would amend Title VII to include protection
for discrimination against “affectional and sexual orientation” have
passed.117 However, despite all of these attempts to include sexual
orientation as a protected class under Title VII, as the court in Oiler
v. Winn-Dixie pointed out, no attempts have been made by Congress
to ban discrimination based on sexual or gender identity.118 The court
considered Congress’ failure to clearly include sexual orientation and
identity in the definition of “based on sex” to be ample indication that
it did not intend those classes to be included in the protection,
especially considering Congress’ awareness of courts’ twenty-year
struggle over the issue.119 In considering whether the plaintiff in
Oiler v. Winn-Dixie could find relief under a Price Waterhouse sex
stereotyping theory, the court stated that transgenderedness was a
“matter of a person of one sex assuming the role of a person of the

LAP, 1996 WL 737215, at *7 (S.D.N.Y 1996); James v. Ranch Mart Hardware, Inc., No. 94-2235KHV., 1994 WL 731517, at *1 (D. Kan. Dec. 23, 1994); Dobre v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 850
F.Supp.284, 286–87 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Doe v. U.S. Postal Serv., Civ. A. No. 84-3296, 1985 WL 9446 at
*2 (D.D.C. June 12, 1985); Powell v. Read’s, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369, 370 (E.D. Md. 1977)).
115. Id. at *4.
116. Id.
117. Id. at *4 n.53 (citing more than thirty rejected or pending legislative proposals spanning from
1981 to 2001).
Sexual or affectional orientation means having or being perceived as having an emotional
or physical attachment to another consenting adult person or persons, or having or being
perceived as having an orientation for such attachment, or having or being perceived as
having a self-image or identity not traditionally associated with one’s biological maleness
or one’s biological femaleness.
Paisley Currah, Unprincipled Exclusions: The Struggle to Achieve Judicial and Legislative Equality for
Transgender People, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 37, 64 (2000).
118. Oiler, 2002 WL 31098541, at *4. The court instructed both parties to provide support showing
Congress’ intent to include gender identity—as opposed to sexual orientation—in the definition of based
on sex for purposes of employment discrimination, but neither could. Id. at *4 n.54.
119. Id. at *4 n.52.

Published by Reading Room, 2012

19

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 11

1332

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:4

opposite sex,” versus “exhibiting characteristics associated with the
opposite sex,” and found that claim failed as well.120
III. PROPOSAL FOR PROTECTION AGAINST TRANSGENDER
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
As mentioned, the Supreme Court has not definitively answered
the question of whether transsexual employees are entitled to
protection against employment discrimination121 under Title VII or
the Equal Protection Clause. Nor has the Court decided whether the
sex stereotype theory established in Price Waterhouse applies to a
constitutional discrimination claim.122 Given the lower courts’
differing interpretations of the meaning of “based on sex,” the issue
will likely soon come before the Supreme Court.123 On appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the order granting plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment in Glenn v. Brumby.124 Although most of the
precedent relied on by Judge Story came from different circuits,125 a
reversal of Glenn v. Brumby by the Eleventh Circuit would have been
120. Id. at *6.
121. Leonard, supra note 12. The plaintiff in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines petitioned the Supreme Court
in 1985 for writ of certiorari after the seventh circuit held transsexuals are not entitled to protection
under Title VII, but certiorari was denied. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 471 U.S. 1017 (1985).
122. Leonard, supra note 12; see also Kastl v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. Civ.021531PHX-SRB, 2004 WL 2008954, at *8 (D. Ariz. June 3, 2004).
123. Weiss, supra note 22, at 575. The “meaning of the term sex has changed since 1964, and now
includes concepts of gender and gender identity.” Id. at 638.
124. Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 2011). Defendant Sewell Brumby timely
appealed the decision of the district court, stating that the lower court erred in granting summary
judgment because the decision to terminate plaintiff was not based on sex. Corrected Brief of Appellant
Sewell R. Brumby at 2–3, Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (2011) (No, 10-14833-D). Acknowledging
that “if gender stereotyping motivates an adverse employment decision, it can be considered
discrimination based on sex,” Brumby urged the court to distinguish “whether the decision to terminate
Glenn was based on his being transgender and his stated intention to surgically transition to a woman, or
was it based on a gender stereotype that Glenn was not sufficiently masculine.” Id. at 15, 20. Brumby
focused on Glenn’s transition as the cause of termination rather than gender motivation, and again only
argued governmental interests under the rational basis test rather than the heightened scrutiny ordered by
Judge Story. Id. at 27–28. Plaintiff cross-appealed, claiming the district court erred in granting summary
judgment to Brumby on the medical condition claim. Corrected Brief of Appellee Vandiver Elizabeth
Glenn at 2, Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (2011) (Nos. 10515-DD, 10-14833-D).
125. In “concur[ing] with the majority of courts that have addressed this issue,” Judge Story cited
Sixth, Tenth, and Ninth Circuit decisions, and cases from the Northern District of Indiana, Southern
District of Texas, and District of Columbia. Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1299 (N.D. Ga.
2010), aff’d, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011).
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a “sharp departure from the growing body of case law supporting the
use of sex discrimination theory in transgender discrimination cases
that focus heavily on gender expression.”126 If Glenn v. Brumby made
its way to the Supreme Court, the Court should follow the Eleventh
Circuit and Judge Story’s reasoning and affirm the decision.127
A. Deciding a Case of Discrimination Against a Transgender
Employee Using a “Plain Meaning” Approach
If and when the issue of whether transgender employees are
entitled to protection against workplace discrimination reaches the
Supreme Court, one approach the Supreme Court could take is to
follow the reasoning used in the early cases brought on the issue,128
and more recently in Oiler v. Winn-Dixie.129 Under this approach, the
Supreme Court could look to congressional intent and the lack of
specific inclusion of gender identity, focusing on the plain meaning
of “based on sex.” This approach would deny the protections of Title
VII to transsexual employees since this reasoning leads to the
conclusion that sex discrimination can only exist as a result of being
a man or a woman, not the transition from one to the other.130 This is
the same biological definition logic used in holding that transsexuals
are not a protected class for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause;
as the Ninth Circuit described in Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
“[T]ranssexuality is [not] an ‘immutable characteristic determined
solely . . . [at] birth’ like race or national origin.”131

126. Leonard, supra note 12.
127. In analyzing whether a stereotyped transgendered individual is entitled to protection, the court
stated that the “nature of the discrimination is the same; it may differ in degree but not in kind, and
discrimination on this basis is a form of sex-based discrimination that is subject to heightened scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause.” Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2011).
128. See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 471 U.S. 1017 (1985); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667
F.2d 748, 749 (8th Cir. 1982); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977).
129. Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ. A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541, at *4 (E.D. La. Sept.
16, 2002) (following the reasoning of earlier decisions Ulane, Sommers, and Holloway).
130. See Todd Weiss, supra note 22, at 576 (“Transgender identity is not sex; it is changing sex, a
different concept altogether.”).
131. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 663. A number of courts have held as a matter of law that transsexuals are
not a protected class under the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 971
(10th Cir. 1995); Rush v. Johnson, 565 F. Supp. 856, 868 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
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Should the Supreme Court follow the plain meaning or legislative
intent approach, a transsexual bringing a claim of employment
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause would be entitled to
the lowest level of scrutiny—the rational relationship test—to
determine whether the employer’s reasons for the employment action
are justified. Under this standard, the employer would only need to
show a reasonably conceivable state of facts that provide a rational
basis for the action without considering the employer’s actual
purpose or motivation since the employment action is not “based on
sex.”132 This requires very little in the way of justification for
actions—almost any action could pass the test133—which would
make it difficult for a transgendered employee to ever find relief
from suffering workplace discrimination.
B. Adopting the Approach of Glenn v. Brumby
1. Sex Stereotyping Theory Should Apply to Transsexuals
Instead of taking an approach based on perceived legislative
intent134 and a restrictive meaning of “based on sex,” when the
Supreme Court is finally faced with deciding whether transsexual
employees are protected against discrimination, it should adopt the
approach taken by Judge Story in Glenn v. Brumby. In adopting this
suggestion, the Court need not even debate whether the 1964
Congress was just speaking about chromosomes when it originally
made discrimination based on “sex” unlawful, nor stress over
whether thirty-plus attempts to amend Title VII without including
“gender identity” means Congress does not intend for that class to be
protected. In fact, Ms. Glenn did not argue,135 and Judge Story did
132. See Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1358 (11th Cir. 2000) (explaining the steps of the
rational basis test).
133. Sabrina Ariel Miesowitz, ERA is Still the Way, 3. N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 124, 142 (2008)
(analyzing the history of the equal rights amendment and the constitutional standard of intermediate
scrutiny used in sex based equal protection challenges).
134. The legislative intent argument is based on an “absence of evidence” since it hinges on the
argument that if Congress did intend for transsexuals to be protected, it would have specifically included
this provision. Weiss, supra note 22, at 638.
135. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment Against
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not address, the issue of whether the meaning of sex itself should be
or was altered, nor whether discrimination based on changing sex is
the same as discrimination based on being a man or woman.136
The court had no need to focus on whether it is unlawful to
discriminate against a transsexual for being a transsexual because the
Supreme Court already recognized a separate interpretation of “based
on sex” when it decided Price Waterhouse.137 Courts that have given
relief to transsexual plaintiffs have done so on the basis of the sex
stereotyping theory set forth in Price Waterhouse,138 and so this will
likely be at least one of the theories of discriminatory conduct that
reaches the Supreme Court. Most lower courts have accepted that the
sex stereotype theory may be extended to transsexual employees
because the theory established that “Title VII’s reference to ‘sex’
encompasses both the biological differences between men and
women, and gender discrimination, that is, discrimination based on a
failure to conform to stereotypical gender norms.”139 The Supreme
Court should follow the lower courts’ lead and find that the sex
stereotyping theory applies to men failing to conform to masculine
stereotypes. To hold the theory only applies to women failing to
conform to an employer’s perception of how a woman should behave
would be discriminatory.

Defendant Sewell R. Brumby, supra note 80 (relying on arguments based on plaintiff being a member of
a group of individuals who do not conform to sex stereotypes, rather than arguing that plaintiff, as a
transsexual, is in a group based solely on that status).
136. Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284 (N.D. Ga. 2010), aff’d, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011).
Plaintiff’s claims for relief were based on being treated differently due to her failure to conform to sex
stereotypes, and for discrimination based on a medical condition. Id. at 1293. Therefore Judge Story did
not analyze whether transsexuality falls within the meaning of sex per se, except to note the distinction
between transsexuals being members of a protected class versus the class of those not conforming to sex
stereotypes. Id. at 1300.
137. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); see also discussion supra Part II.B.
138. E.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 571 (6th Cir. 2004); Schroer v. Billington, 525 F.
Supp. 2d 58, 62 (D.D.C. 2007).
139. Smith, 378 F.3d at 573.
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2. Sex Stereotyping Theory Should Apply to Claims Under the
Equal Protection Clause and be Subject to an Intermediate
Scrutiny
Once the Supreme Court decides whether the Price Waterhouse
sex stereotyping theory applies to transsexuals—or men at all140—it
should also hold that the sex stereotyping theory applies to sex
discrimination claims brought under the Equal Protection Clause. It is
well established that the elements of a Title VII claim are used to
analyze an employment discrimination claim brought under the Equal
Protection Clause,141 and so the Court should also apply the sex
stereotyping theory created under a Title VII claim to constitutional
claims. It is not a stretch to extend the stereotype theory to an Equal
Protection Clause claim brought essentially to remedy the same
employer conduct, especially given that the Title VII sex stereotyping
theory has been used as an analogy in non-employment contexts. For
example, the First Circuit held a transsexual plaintiff stated a claim
under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the Ninth Circuit applied
the sex stereotyping theory of Title VII to allow a claim by a
transsexual under the Gender Motivated Violence Act.142
In borrowing from Title VII precedent and reasoning, Judge Story
recognized that a separate protected class existed: “those who do not
conform to gender stereotypes.”143 This placed the transsexual
plaintiff in an identifiable group “based on sex,” entitling her to the
heightened intermediate scrutiny for all claims based on sex. This is
the approach the Supreme Court should adopt in deciding an
employment discrimination claim brought under the Equal Protection
Clause. Again, as it is essentially the same elements and same
conduct as a claim the Supreme Court has already recognized as a
class deserving of protection, it is a logical decision to give an
140. The Supreme Court has decided that a sex discrimination claim can be brought by a male based
on sexual harassment by a fellow male. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82
(1998).
141. See discussion supra Part II.A.
142. Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust, 214 F.3d 213, 215–16 (1st Cir. 2000); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204
F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000).
143. Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284 at 1300 (N.D. Ga. 2010), aff’d, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir.
2011).
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intermediate rather than rational basis scrutiny to constitutional
claims. Indeed, the burden is on the defendant to show a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment action to defeat
a Title VII claim, so it is illogical to reason that the governmental
agency defendant in a constitutional discrimination claim should be
allowed to rely on “rational speculation unsupported by any evidence
or empirical data” or require that a plaintiff disprove “every
conceivable basis which might support” the state action.144
CONCLUSION
The question of whether a transsexual employee is protected
against employment discrimination is a question that needs to be
definitively answered by the Supreme Court. In the decades since the
Civil Rights Act was passed in 1964, courts have struggled over the
meaning of the word “sex,” especially as it applies to nontraditional
groups such as transsexual employees.145 The Supreme Court should
put an end to this struggle by deciding that a transsexual plaintiff can
bring a claim based on the Price Waterhouse theory of sex
stereotyping, and also that the sex stereotyping theory be used in
Equal Protection Clause claims.
The proposed Supreme Court decision does not provide an easy
route for the transsexual employee who feels he or she has been
discriminated against in the workplace. The proposed solution is not
to hold transsexuality as a protected class in and of itself, but rather
to conclude that transsexuals are within the class—in the case of a
constitutional claim, an identifiable group—that was created by the
Supreme Court’s Price Waterhouse decision. Therefore, to obtain
relief, a plaintiff will not need to simply show an employment action
was taken because he or she was a transsexual, but will need to prove
144. FCC v. Beach Comm’n, 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993). In his brief, defendant Brumby points to FCC
v. Beach in arguing the government “has no obligation to produce evidence to support the rationality of
its . . . classifications,” and the fact the reasons “are arguable is sufficient to withstand rational basis
review.” Defendant Sewell Brumby’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, supra note 96, at 3.
145. See generally Weiss, supra note 22.
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by specific, direct evidence that the actions taken were because of
gender stereotypes.146 This may mean clever lawyering in a
plaintiff’s pleadings to survive a motion to dismiss, but by requiring
more than a rational basis scrutiny, it will also mean a defendant’s
pleadings will need more than just a conceivable set of facts
rationally related to a legitimate interest. The best consequence of the
proposed Supreme Court decision would be to enable lower courts to
focus on the conduct of the parties in a discrimination case rather
than sorting out the meaning of sex and gender; after all, “the Equal
Protection Clause forbids sex discrimination no matter how it is
labeled.”147

146. Kelly, supra note 23, at 230 (suggesting the standard of “specific, direct evidence” for sex
stereotyping claims makes it unlikely that transgender employees will find relief under Title VII, short
of actually hearing an employer state they are “too masculine for a woman” or “too feminine for a
man”).
147. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 118–19 (2d Cir. 2004).
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